This paper proposes a theory of socially optimal districting in a simple probabilistic voting model of legislative elections with endogenous party platforms. Two parties compete in order to obtain the majority in the House in a first-past-the-post electoral system, after the social planner has distributed partisan and independent voters across districts. Districting affects the implemented policy through parties' strategic decision of their policy platforms, citizens' voting behaviour and the consequent political majority in the elected House. The social planner should implement a districting that mirrors the ideological leaning of the population, in order to allow parties to internalise voters' preferences in their policy proposals. In contrast with the findings of Coate and Knight (2007), who do not allow for endogenous party platforms, the seat-vote curve stemming from this districting is unbiased if voters are risk neutral and biased against the largest partisan group in case of risk-averse voters. An empirical analysis on a dataset of 28 U.S. State legislative elections from 1992 to 2000 is performed. Through a simple panel data technique and Monte Carlo simulations the partisan composition of each district is inferred from electoral and demographic data at the district level and state-level polls on ideological selfidentification. The results obtained are then used to calculate the potential welfare gain from implementing the socially optimal districting plan, through a calibration of the theoretical model. The size of the welfare gain is generally below 1%, even smaller than the one found by Coate and Knight (2007) .
Introduction
The districting process has been object of increasing attention from politicians and scholars of both economics and political science. The way district boundaries are drawn can have substantial effect on the implemented policy, influencing parties' decisions on their proposed platforms and determining the relation between citizens' voting behavior and the composition of the House. The classic Downsian benchmark suggesting that voters' preferences, and in particular the median voter's ones, determine the policy outcome can be easily altered at someone's favor through strategic reapportionment.
This process of strategic redistricting is called gerrymandering and has been denounced for exacerbating the flaws of single-member-district elections. First-pastthe-post electoral systems have been often criticized for the frequency with which districts happen to be non-contendible, making the incentives to participate to the political process very low for voters who prefer the minority party in their district. This is also mirrored by the large number of uncontested Federal and State electoral districts in the U.S., i.e. districts in which only one candidate, often the incumbent, runs for elections. Gerrymandering has also been accused of decreasing competitiveness of elections, increasing the rate of re-election for incumbent representatives and consequently polarizing American politics in general. The increased technological possibilities and the availability of more precise data on voters widened greatly the possibilities of strategic reapportionment and its effects.
An increasing number of States in the U.S. have decided to delegate at least partially the burden of periodic redistricting to independent commissions, in order to limit gerrymandering. Australia, Canada and the UK as well have a long tradition of independent agencies overlooking the process of periodic reapportionment. Nevertheless there are no clear and shared prescriptions for an independent commission on how to conduct this work. The two conflicting criteria usually called into play in the political debate are the safeguard of homogeneous communities, which would avoid irregularly shaped districts, and the creation of competitive districts, which could increase accountability and possibly also decrease polarization. It is not clear, therefore which is the most desirable districting plan from the social welfare point of view. This is the question this paper addresses. This paper analyzes how the design of electoral district boundaries affects the strategic behavior of parties, in particular when choosing a policy platform to propose to voters. Our focus is on the welfare effect of this strategic behavior of parties vis-a-vis the districting. The aim is to have a normative prescription on how districting should be done in order to maximize aggregate voters' welfare. In addition an empirical analysis on the potential welfare gain from implementing the socially optimal districting is performed with data of State Lower Houses elections of 28 U.S. States from 1992 to 2000. 1 The basic framework is one in which two parties, the Democratic and the Republican, propose binding policy platforms to voters in a first-past-the-post electoral system. Each district will elect a representative from one of the two parties, and majority voting in the House will determine which of the two policy platform is implemented. Voters have preferences over the implemented policy, which will depend on parties' endogenous policy platforms and on the composition of the House. It is easy to see how districting can affect both parties' platform choices and the House composition. Voters are divided into three categories: Democrats, Republicans and swing voters (or Independents). The first two types will always vote for their own party, while parties will need to compete for the votes of Independents. Some uncertainty is introduced, through an aggregate random shock of known distribution hitting swing voters' preferences.
The distribution of partisans and swing voters across districts, and the consequential policy platform choice by parties, will determine the composition of the legislature, and more generally the seat-vote curve. The seat-vote curve is a relation S(V ) that links the aggregate share of votes for the Democratic party to its seat share in the legislature. There is a large empirical literature (of which is given account in the next Section) that attempts to estimate this relation, and in particular its bias and responsiveness. A biased electoral system is one that awards more (or less) than half of the seats to the party that receives exactly half of the votes (S(1/2) = 1/2). Responsiveness indicates how the seat share awarded to a party changes with the variation of its vote share (∆S/∆V ).
Parties will face a trade-off between sticking to their own preferred ideology and therefore pleasing their core partisan supporters on the one hand, and giving in to centrist Independent voters through less extremist policy platforms on the other hand: a trade-off between ideological coherence and the probability of winning. Given that majority voting in the House will determine the policy, the place parties will look at when deciding their policy platforms is the median district, i.e. the district needed to obtain a majority of seats.
In this framework we analyze the socially optimal districting plan. This will be a plan through which the combined behavior of parties proposing the policy platform and the citizens' voting choices generates an expected implemented policy that corresponds to the one which maximizes the social welfare, i.e. the average preferred policy. Simply allowing parties to strategically adjust their policy platforms according to the districting plan they face, compels the social planner to very different prescriptions to the one found in the literature (namely, in Coate and Knight (2007) ). Parties in fact will internalize the population's ideological leaning, choosing platforms coherent to the "efficient", welfare-maximising policy, as long as the social planner draws the district lines in a way that mirrors the population's ideological leaning. Consequently the socially optimal seat-vote curve, which was prescribed to be bias in favor of the larger partisan group in Coate and Knight (2007) , must be unbiased. in the basic scenario in which voters are risk-neutral, no bias is needed in the electoral system: awarding half of the seats for half of the votes would result in the welfare maximising policy to be (in expectations) implemented.
An empirical analysis of the current districting plans and of the possible welfare gain from implementing the socially optimal districting is performed. The database used is the same of Coate and Knight (2007) : it contains the Lower House elections of 28 U.S. States during the 1990s. Their empirical approach is adapted in order to estimate through a bootstrapping technique the share of Democrats, Republicans and Independents in each district from electoral and demographic data at the district level, and opinion polls on party allegiance at the State level. These estimates are then used to calibrate the theoretical model and calculate the possible welfare gain from implementing the optimal districting plan. Our main result is that the welfare gain from implementing the socially optimal districting is for the large majority of the States in the sample below 1%, even smaller than in Coate and Knight (2007) .
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the related literature, section 3 explains the model and section 4 solves the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. Section 5 contains the extensions to the theoretical model, Section 6 the empirical calibration and Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
The welfare and policy effects of districting are relatively unexplored topics in the literature. The two seminal papers on these topics are Besley and Preston (2007) and Coate and Knight (2007) . The former paper investigates specifically the effect of districting on the policies proposed by parties, i.e. how parties which decide endogenously their policy platform take into consideration the districting in their decision process. In their model parties strategically propose a nationwide platform, after having observed the districting, and the policy is chosen by the party which obtains a parliamentary majority. Their finding is that, as long as the policy space is linear, then both parties' proposed policies will be dragged towards the same side the districting is biased. If, instead, the policy space is a vector, the effect of the districting on parties' policy platform is uncertain. Coate and Knight (2007) is the first paper that to my knowledge does a thorough analysis of the welfare effects of districting. In their seminal paper, they model a two party system in which parties propose exogenous platforms. The implemented policy is the result of an ex-post bargaining between the two party caucuses in the elected House. The House will pass the policy that maximizes the joint utility of all the Representatives, i.e. a policy which is the average of the two parties' exogenous platforms weighted by the seat shares. The optimal seat-vote curve is then characterized, deriving it directly from the aggregate utility maximisation problem.
In their model the social planner's aim is to implement a seat-vote curve such that the preferred policy of the average legislator coincides with the welfare maximising policy (i.e. the average population's preferred policy). Given the risk-aversion of voters, the welfare-maximising policy will be particularly influenced by voters at the extremes of the policy spectrum (partisans), and in particular by that of the largest partisan group. Moreover the implemented policy changes very smoothly with the changes in the House composition. This is why, unlike our paper, Coate and Knight find that the socially optimal seat-vote curve must be biased towards the party which has more partisans in the population. If, instead, voters were risk-neutral their result would disappear, and the welfare optimum would be implemented through an unbiased seat-vote curve. 2 Our paper differs from the one by Coate and Knight (2007) in the way policies come to be implemented: we enodgenize parties' decision on the platform proposed to voters, and simplify the decision making process of the parliament, which will not happen through a particular kind of bargaining between parties, but through simple majority voting.
Most of the existing work on redistricting focuses instead on efficient partisan gerrymandering, i.e. how a party which is in control of the districting process can maximize its seat share or the probability to obtain a working majority, or bipartisan gerrymandering, whose aim is to guarantee the re-election of incumbents. Owen and Grofman (1988) , Sherstyuk (1998), and Friedman and Holden (2008) are the most representative examples. Shotts (2002) , Epstein and O'Hallaran (2004) , Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006) , and Pesendorfer and Gul (2007) give also insight on the policy and welfare consequences of redistricting. The latter of these analyzes the effect of gerrymandering on parties' policy platform at the U.S. federal level, where each party (through State governors or legislators) has power over a number of federal congressional districts. Their finding that the party which has the power to gerrymander the majority of districts will stick to its preferred (and extreme) policy, while the "minority" party will try to recuperate votes proposing a centrist policy. Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006) focus as well on the effect of partisan gerrymandering on policy platforms with a median-voter approach. It compares the median voter's with the median representative's preferred policy (i.e. the median voter of the median district). Their approach to the welfare analysis is done through analyzing how the maximum distance between these two policies varies with the number of voters and the number of elected representatives. Our approach differs from theirs in the fact that we focus on the efficient policy outcome, i.e. the welfare maximising (average) preferred policy rather than the policy which has the approval of a majority of citizens, i.e. the median citizen's preferred policy. Shotts (2002) and Epstein and O'Hallaran (2004) analyze instead minorities' representation and their welfare. In particular they analyze the effects of the existence of majority-minority districts, i.e. districts in which the majority of the population belongs to a minority (typically, African-Americans or Latinos). The former is a theoretical model that looks into the effect of the existence of this kind of districts on the median legislator's preferred policy, in an institutional setup that mirrors the Federal House of Representatives (each party gerrymanders a share of the districts). The latter looks into whether the interests of minorities (namely, African-American voters) can be better represented through majority-minority districts electing black Representatives (descriptive representation), or through districts in which the black constituents manage to influence substantially the elected officer's actions (substantive representation).
Our work also relates to the wider electoral-competition literature. In particular our results can be easily related to the one obtained by Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1983) , which extend the classic Downsian setup describing simultaneously policythe seat-vote curve that would stem from the welfare maximization problem can easily be shown to be
where π I is the share of Independents and τ represents the preference heterogeneity among independent voters. As one can easily notice, this is unbiased, i.e. half of the seats are awarded in correspondence with half of the votes (S(1/2) = 1/2). The mathematical analysis of this is relegated in the Appendix.
and office-motivated candidates. Our paper takes on their approach, and in particular on Calvert's one, which allows for uncertainty in the distribution of voters. We extend the basic model introducing the districting as a key feature for the formation of the political outcome. Both in Calvert (1985) and in the present paper the classic Downsian result of policy convergence to the median voter's position does not hold anymore. The combined effect of uncertainty, policy motivation and ideological preferences generates an outcome in which the proposed policies do not completely converge. Still in this strand of literature, more recently, Callander (2008) analyzes instead the combined effect of policy-and office-motivation in a richer theoretical setup. Both in the present and in Callander's paper, as long as there is sufficient ideological heterogeneity among candidates, the more office-motivated candidates propose policies nearer to the efficient one. This paper's empirical analysis can be also related to the long-standing literature which tries to estimate the seat-vote curve. The seminal paper of this literature is Kendall and Stewart (1950) , which used British data and a log-odds functional form, and stated the famous "cube-law", referring to the responsiveness of the British electoral system. Gelman and King (1994) , among others, developed a statistical methodology to estimate the seat-vote curve and to predict the effect of majority-minority districts, also taking into account how the composition of districts affects the electoral outcome. Coate and Knight (2007) instead developed an econometric technique in order to estimate, through some Monte Carlo simulations, the compositions of an electoral district (i.e. how many partisan Democrats, partisan Republicans and Independents are in each district) through the electoral and demographic data at the district level and through opinion polls at the State level. The empirical analysis of this paper is largely in debt to their analysis, and is performed on their same database.
The Model
There are two parties, the Democrats (D) and the Republicans (R). Voters are heterogeneous with respect to their preferred ideology, represented on the unit line, and can be divided in three categories according to their preferences: Democrats, Republicans and swing voters (or Independents). The Democrats and Republicans will be collectively referred to as partisan voters or party members. Democrats' preferred policy is 0, while Republicans' preferred policy is 1.
Following Coate (2004) , swing voters are distributed symmetrically around their median according to a uniform distribution:
, where m is the median swing voter, and ω the ideal point of a generic swing voter.
The position of the median swing voter is the realization of a random variable m ∼ U [1/2 − , 1/2 + ], with cumulative distribution function H(m) = m−1/2+ 2 . To avoid the possibility of a swing voter being more extremist than party members, it is assumed that + τ ≤ 1/2. The two distributions can be thought as an idiosyncratic and an aggregate shock hitting Independent voters' preferences. It must be noted that swing voters are in expectation (and on average) centrists; the median swing voter preferred policy is expected to be equidistant from the extremes of the policy line (E[m] = 1/2). These two distributions are common knowledge, but the realization of m remains unknown to players.
In the whole country there is a continuum of voters i ∈ [0, 1], distributed in a continuum of districts indexed with the letter j. This feature, even if obviously unrealistic, will substantially ease the calculations, and represents with a sufficient degree of approximation elections with a large number of districts and voters.
In each district j there is a share π Ij of swing voters, a share π Dj of Democrats, and a share π Rj of Republicans, with π Ij + π Dj + π Rj = 1. Given that the size of the whole electorate is 1, average and population values for the share of swing voters, Democrats and Republicans are equivalent, and will be indicated with barred variables (π I , π D , π R ).
Preferences are Euclidean, therefore the utility function of a citizen with ideal point i ∈ [0, 1] is a function of the distance between his or her ideal point and the implemented policy x.
where L is a generic symmetric loss function on the distance −|i − x|. Parties share similar preferences as their members: they want a policy as near as possible to the one preferred by their members (i.e. partisan voters), moreover they receive a utility premium Ω s , s ∈ {D, R}, in case of victory. This term can be interpreted both as the office motivation, as opposed to policy motivation, of parties, or also as the concern for swing voters' welfare as opposed to their own partisans' welfare. Therefore if the Democratic party wins the elections, parties' utilities are:
while if the Republican party wins, the utilities become:
where {d, r} are respectively the endogenous party platforms of the Democratic and Republican party. Given the districting, parties will commit to a nationwide policy that maximizes their expected utility. The problem of the credibility of parties commitment to the publicly announced policy platform goes beyond the scope of this paper, nevertheless we could even assume that parties, following the standard citizen-candidate models (Besley and Coate (1997) , Osborne and Slivinski (1996) ), commit to a particular policy through fielding a candidate whose preferences correspond to the party's policy choice. Alternatively we can think the proposed platform as the result of a repeated game with voters as in Alesina (1988) . We can imagine that parties will face a trade-off: on one hand they will want to propose a more centrist policy in order to win the Independents' votes and increase their probability of winning, on the other hand they would prefer a policy nearer to their preferences, and therefore more extremist. In each district voters vote sincerely for the candidate with the policy that is nearer to their ideal point. The tie breaking rule is a random draw. The candidate with the most votes is elected as a Representative.
Finally, the elected House decides by majority voting (again with a random draw as tie-breaking rule) the policy to implement. It can be easily guessed how the Representative elected by the median district is going to be the only relevant for the policy choice. Further on in the paper a case in which the elected Representatives bargain over the policy to implement will also be analyzed.
The timing of the game is therefore as follows:
1. A districting plan is implemented.
2. Parties commit to policies {d, r} ∈ [0, 1].
3. The position of the median voter m is drawn from its distribution.
4. Citizens vote and in each district and the candidate with the most votes is elected.
5. The elected House votes to decide between the two policies and the one that obtains a majority is implemented.
The focus of this paper is on analyzing the welfare effects of the districting plan when the policies proposed by parties are endogenous.
Theoretical Results
We can now start to solve the game by backward induction, analyzing the voting behavior in a representative district, then finding the optimal policies proposed by the two parties, and finally looking for the districting plan that maximizes social welfare.
As a benchmark, we begin by focusing on the case in which parties and voters are risk neutral, therefore their loss functions in (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) is L(x, i) = −|i − x|, and the utility functions of parties and voters are:
when the Democratic party wins, and
when the Republican party wins. Further on in the paper the analysis will be extended to a case where players are risk-averse. We start focusing on a single district j, which contains generically a share π Ij of Independents, and a share π Dj of Democrats.
Before analyzing the risk-neutral case, one assumption is made:
These assumptions are made to avoid a scenario in which the Republican party's policy platform is more liberal than the Democratic party's one (first expression), or in which the probability of winning of a party falls outside the unit interval (second expression).
There will be a swing voter whose preferred policy is the midpoint between d and r who is indifferent between voting Democrat or Republican. The Democratic party therefore carries the district if the partisan Democrats and the share of swing voters to the left of the indifferent voter is more than 50%:
using the formula for F (·), we can rearrange the expression bringing on the left-hand side the parameters related to the composition of the district:
Moreover, given that π Rj = (1 − π Dj − π Ij ), we can rewrite this expression as
and define the variable κ j as the Democratic leaning of a district:
Each district j's behavior is therefore summed up by the value of its Democratic bias κ j . The Democratic party carries this generic district if κ j is greater than the right hand side of (13). This variable assumes value 0 if the district has the same proportion of partisans of each ideology (π Dj = π Rj ) and its absolute value is inversely proportional to the amount of Independents. In addition through simple calculations we can see how a district with κ j > 1 is a safe Democratic district, i.e. a district in which the Democratic party always obtains at least 50% of the votes. Analogously a district with κ j < −1 is a safe Republican district.
Ordering the district according to their skewness value κ j , we can observe how the only district that matters in order to determine the implemented policy is the median one, the one determining the parliamentary majority. Starting from this consideration we can find a closed form solution for the probability of winning of the Democratic party.
Lemma 1. The probability p that the Democratic party wins the election, conditional on parties' policy platforms {d, r} is
where κ m is the Democratic-leaning value κ of the median district.
Proof. See appendix.
The Democratic party's probability of winning increases the more the Democratic policy is to the right (in order to get more votes in the center), the more the Republican policy is extremist, and the more the median district is leaning towards the Democratic party. These effects are all larger the smaller is aggregate uncertainty ( ).
Given the voting behavior just stated, we can find the parties' optimal policies, through the maximisation of their expected utilities:
where, from Lemma 1, the probability of winning for the Democratic party p(d, r) depends on the policy proposals of the two parties. Thus, through simple first order conditions, we can calculate the optimal policy choices of the two parties given the districting.
Proposition 1. The Democratic and Republican parties equilibrium policy platforms are respectively:d
The equilibrium probability of winning therefore becomeŝ
Consistently with Besley and Preston (2007) the districting, represented by the leaning of the median district κ m , drags the proposed policies towards the side the districting is leaning. The victory premium Ω s drives the policies towards the center, in search of the centrist voters, to raise the probability of winning and get the proposed policy nearer to the swing voters' preferred one. The effect of the Ωs on the probability of winning recalls at least partially the results of Callander (2008): more office-motivated candidates win with higher probability, and are also more likely to propose policies nearer to the center (in Callander (2008) they actually propose the policy preferred by the median voter for some parameter values).
This result crucially depends on the voter's utility function. The districting affects exactly in the same ways both parties' platforms because of the symmetry of the loss function and risk-neutrality of preferences.
In our analysis we are going to restrict our attention to the value of κ m within the interval [−1, 1]; as already stated, we know that any κ j outside that range would generate a safe seat, i.e. a seat in which one of the two parties win with probability 1. Our empirical analysis (an andectodal knowledge) confirms that this is not the case in any of the 28 States in our dataset.
The next step is to calculate the social welfare function. The social welfare is defined as the sum of the expected utility of all voters (Democratic and Republican partisans, and swing voters). We do not take into account, instead, parties' utility function. We can therefore write the welfare function in case the median voter's position ism and the implemented policy is a generic policy z:
where π I , π D , and π R are the average (and therefore population) value of the share of Independents, Democrats and Republican and L is the linear loss function already introduced. From the proof to Lemma 1 (in appendix) it is also known that the median district (and with it the general elections) will be won by the democratic party as long as the position of the median voterm falls to the left of a threshold levelm. More precisely the Democratic Party wins wheñ
We can therefore write the social welfare function as:
whered andr are the equilibrium values of d and r.
The socially optimal districting, or the socially optimal median district (which is the same), is identified as the κ m that maximizes (22). As the social welfare function is concave in κ m , the first order conditions are sufficient to find the social optimum.
The social planner's aim is to design a median district such that the expected implemented policypd + (1 −p)r is equal to the efficient policy, i.e. to the average preferred policy. We define therefore κ * m as the socially optimal median district. First a technical condition is stated:
Proposition 2. To implement a welfare maximising districting, the median district must have a skewness κ m such that
as long as Condition 1 holds. When Condition 1 does not hold instead, the socially optimal skewness κ m satisfies the following inequality:
Proof in Appendix
The first part of the Proposition shows that the welfare maximizing districting implies a (socially optimal) median district which is skewed in the same direction as the overall population skewness, as long as parties are equally office-motivated (Ω D = Ω R ). The optimal skewness of the median district is also inversely related to the overall share of Independents (π I ). As long as parties are equally officemotivated, the bias κ m of the median district must exactly reflect the population composition. The median district could be, for example, an exact microcosm of the whole community.
Proposition 2 also implies that the median district must lean towards the party that is more office-motivated, or more interested in swing voters' welfare (higher Ω). This depends on the fact that, for example, if the Democratic party's preference for victory Ω D is increased, the expected implemented policyd moves marginally to the right. Consequently, in order to cancel out this effect and restore the correspondence between the efficient policy and the expected implemented policy, the social planner needs to modify the skewness of the median district increasing the proportion of Democrats, and thereby moving both policy platforms to the left. This also recalls the results of Callander (2008) , according to which the more officemotivated candidate (i.e. the one with higher Ω s in our model) is more likely to propose policies nearer to the efficient one.
In case the population is particularly unbalanced (Condition 1 does not hold, as in the second part of the Proposition), the socially optimal districting will imply a median district more "extremist" than the population as a whole. This mostly depends on technical reasons, which are thoroughly explained in the proof of Proposition 2.
Finally, even if we chose to follow the long tradition of abstracting from geographical constraints, some words are still needed on the feasibility of the socially optimal districting. To begin with, with symmetric party, it is obvious how it is always feasible to have a median district that mirrors the population composition. Moreover, in case parties are asymmetric in their office motivation, the actual value of the optimal κ * m moves away from the "microcosm" value of at most a few hundredths of a unit. This in turn makes the feasibility constraints to the implementation of the socially optimal districting very unlikely to be in any way binding.
The Seat-Vote Curve
The next step is to find the seat-vote curve that is consistent with the socially optimal districting. The seat-vote curve is a mathematical relation S(V ) that links the amount of votes obtained by a party at the national level with the amount of seats won in the House. We can think of it as if each election result corresponding to a point in the seat-vote graph.
In our model the policy to be implemented is decided by majority voting in the House, i.e. by the median legislator. Consequently, from the welfare point of view, whether a party has a slim or an overwhelming majority in the House is irrelevant: the implemented policy would in fact be the same. In order to reach the welfare optimum it is required that the two policy platforms and the composition of the House are such that the implemented policy matches the socially optimal policy. For this reason it is structurally impossible to find a unique seat-vote curve that would maximize social welfare. It is however possible to characterize the seat-vote curve behavior in correspondence of the median district and consequently, given the socially optimal median district, whether the seat-vote curve is going to be biased or not.
The bias the seat-vote curve is defined as
The value of the bias α represents how many seats over the cut-off of 50% the Democratic party obtains in correspondence to 50% of the votes. It is therefore going to be positive if the districting favors the Democratic party, awarding to it a majority of seats in correspondence to only half of the votes. It will be negative if it favors the Republican party and zero when half of the votes corresponds to exactly half of the seats.
Starting from the results obtained in the previous section, it is possible to calculate which party is going to carry the median district, when the Democratic party obtains exactly 50% of votes. If the median district were carried by the Democratic party, this would mean that Democrats are in majority in the House after having obtained half of the votes, and therefore the bias α is positive; if the median district were carried by the Republicans, then of course the bias α is negative. Finally, if when 50% of the votes at the national level correspond to 50% of the votes in the median district, the bias α is zero.
A further definition is introduced: we define a bias as "reinforcing" if it favors the party with the largest partisan base, and "counterbalancing" if it favors the smallest partisan group, i.e. Lemma 2. The seat-vote curve has a positive bias α > 0 if the median district is more skewed towards the Democrats than the whole population, a negative bias α < 0 if the median district is more skewed towards the Republican than the whole population, and no bias α = 0 if the median district's skewness mirrors the population skewness, i.e.:
Proof in Appendix
This leads us into the main result of this section:
Proposition 3. The seat-vote curve is unbiased (α = 0) when the socially optimal districting is implemented, both parties are equally office-motivated (Ω D = Ω R ), and Condition 1 holds. If parties are not equally office-motivated, the seat-vote curve has a reinforcing bias in favor of the more office-motivated one. If the population's ideology is particularly unbalanced (Condition 1 does not hold), then the optimal seat-vote curve will include a bias in favor of the party most represented in the population.
As long as Condition 1 holds, when the socially optimal district is implemented, the bias α is going to be in favor of the more office-motivated party, i.e. it will be positive if the Democratic party is more office-motivated (Ω D > Ω R ) and negative (i.e. in favor of the Republicans) if the Republican party is more office-motivated (Ω D < Ω R ). When the population composition is very extremist (Condition 1 does not hold), the bias will again be reinforcing, i.e. it will favor the party that has the larger popular support.
Even more interestingly, when parties are equally office-motivated and the population's ideology is balanced enough, the socially optimal seat-vote curve must not be biased: no party should get any advantage from the districting.
The intuition of this can be easily explained. From Proposition 2 we know that as long as Condition 1 holds and both parties are equally office-motivated, in equilibrium the median district will be a microcosm of the whole population with
therefore its voting behavior will reflect exactly the national voting pattern. This means that when at the national level the Democratic party obtains half of the votes, in the median district the result will be the same and elections will be tied. This in turn implies that exactly half of the seats will be awarded to each party, therefore the seat-vote curve is going to be unbiased. The rationale for this finding lies in the fact that in this model parties adjust their policies according to the districting, therefore if the districting leans, say, towards the Democrats, the expected winning policy will be dragged towards the left. Moreover we have seen how the optimal districting involves a median district that mirrors the population composition: a left-leaning population needs a left-leaning median district. If this happens, the expected winning policy is already leaning more on the left, and there is no need to give further advantage to the Democratic party: both parties will already offer more liberal policies. In a sense we can say that the very fact that policies are endogenous "internalizes" the population leaning, and makes it useless to enhance an additional bias in the seat-vote curve.
The intuitive reason why the social planner should award an advantage (bias in its favor) to the more office-motivated party is straightforward. The social planner rewards in this way the fact that the more office-motivated party will propose a policy platform nearer to the socially optimal one, because it will be more interested in winning the independent votes and increasing its probability to win.
Extensions to the Theoretical Model
In this section we analyze the robustness of our theoretical results. Section 5.1 discusses what is the effect of assuming risk-averse voters and parties. Section 5.2 focuses on an extension of the model in which the policy is decided through a bargaining processà la Coate and Knight (2007) , in order to verify if our results crucially depend on the Constitution and the political customs through which the policy to implement is decided.
The Case of Risk-averse Voters and Parties: Quadratic Loss Utility Functions
We now analyze the case in which parties and citizens are risk-averse. As in Coate and Knight (2007) the preferences are assumed to be quadratic in the 'ideological' distance. Therefore the loss function functional form becomes: L(i, x) = −(i − x) 2 , and citizen i's utility if policy x is implemented becomes:
and analogously for parties, if the Democratic party wins:
while if the Republican party wins:
The same procedure is followed as in the linear case. For the intricacies of the calculations, a further assumption is made.
Assumption 2. Parties are solely policy-motivated:
Having risk-averse voters and parties substantially complicates the mathematics of this problem. This assumption is made in order to simplify the mathematical simulations reducing the number of variables, and letting the results be more clear. Both parties will therefore maximize the following utility functions choosing their policy proposals.
It can be noticed how the utility functions are third-degree polynomials in the policies {d, r}. The first order conditions are:
Through the first and second order conditions, the policy platform reaction functions can be found, and consequently the equilibrium policy platform of the two parties {d,r}.
and finally the equilibrium probability of winning for the Democratic partyp(π D , π R , κ m , τ , ) using Lemma 1, and equations (35) and (36). These findings are then plugged in the Social Welfare function as in (22), which is then maximized with respect to the variable that determines the districting, i.e. the skewness of the median district κ m . It is easy to understand how it is not possible to find a closed form solution for the skewness of the socially optimal median district in case of risk-averse players. The results of these section are therefore the outcome of numerical simulations.
Lemma 3. When voters and parties have quadratic utility function, there exist values of the parameters such that
There are values of the parameters such that the optimal skewness for the median district is smaller in absolute value than in the linear case. Our numerical simulations consistently gave us this result as long as π D + π R > 30%, which is a condition that is met by all the 50 States in the USA, according to the NYT-CBS annual polls and a fortiori in all the States in our empirical analysis.
As an example the simulations results are exposed through three graphs ( Figure  I ) of the skewness of the socially optimal median district κ * m at the variation of the share of Democrats in the population, in case of linear and quadratic utility function, for certain level of the parameters.
When the social planner lays down the districting, numerical simulations lead us to conclude that in expectations the party with a larger popular support will win the elections with a 50% probability, just as in the linear case. The median district will still be skewed towards the largest party, even if to a lesser extent than in the linear case. The median district still mirrors the leaning of the whole population, but is more "centrist" than the whole population. This in turn implies that the optimal policy platform will still lean in the same direction the whole population is leaning, but "less" than in the baseline case, which implies that the indifferent voter will (again) be more centrist, and therefore the share of votes obtained nationally by the majoritarian party larger, mirroring more closely the population composition. The bottom line of this is that if there are considerably more Democrats than Republicans, the general elections (i.e. the median representative's election) will on average end up in a tie, the median district will contain more Democrats than Republicans, and the nation-wide share of votes will award many more votes to the Democrats.
From the results of the numerical simulations we can also state that the seat-vote curve stemming from such a setup is one which is biased against the larger party (the Democrats in our example): this stems from the fact that the Democratic party would receive less than half of the seats if it had 50% of votes. This can be briefly stated in the following proposition: Proposition 4. When voters and parties are risk-averse, there exist values of the parameters such that the socially optimal seat-vote curve's bias is counterbalancing.
The driving forces of this result are the "conservativeness" of risk-averse parties, and the fact that with quadratic preferences the loss in utility increases more than proportionally with distance. This implies that the marginal utility loss (or gain) of an infinitesimal move of the implemented policy is going to have different magnitude for Democratic and Republican partisans (unless we are exactly in the middle). This means that the social planner will want to drag the policy proposals towards the party with the larger electoral base, but not to much, in order too keep down the (large) utility loss coming from the minority party.
Legislative Bargaining
In this section, in order to have a closer comparison with Coate and Knight (2007) , we make a further robustness check on our baseline model. The setup is adapted to incorporate parliamentary bargaining over the policy to implement. In Coate and Knight (2007) parties represent the two extreme policy platforms (0 and 1), and the House implements a policy which is the average of the two parties' plaforms weighted by their seat shares. In this section we keep our base case characteristics of endogenous party platform, but the policy to implement will be chosen through a bargaining processà la Coate and Knight (2007) and not though majority voting.
For brevity and computational simplicity this attempt is performed on the case of risk-neutral players, and Assumption 2 is kept, so that parties' utility depends only on the policy implemented. This setup implies a particularly highly sophisticated social planner: he or she must anticipate the endogenous parties' policy proposals, their effect on voting in each district, on the composition of the House, and the consequent effect on the "bargaining" in the House. As in Coate and Knight (2007) , we assume that voters vote "naively" to the party proposing the policy nearer to their ideal point, not taking into considerations forms of strategic voting in which citizens anticipate the bargaining in the House. The assumption that each party proposes a single nation-wide policy before the elections is also maintained, and Representatives will stand for that policy, and bargain from that position.
The timing of the game could be therefore be described as follows:
1. The districting is implemented.
2. Parties propose their policies {d, r}.
3. Voters vote in each district for the party whose policy is nearer to their preferred one.
4. The House is elected.
5. Bargaining: the implemented policy x = S d + (1 − S) r is the average between the proposed ones. weighted by the seats of each party, where S is the seat share won by Democrats.
Parties have linear preferences over the implemented policy x:
i.e
where S the seat share obtained by the Democratic party. The social planner, instead of picking the leaning of the median district -which would be meaningless in this setup -picks the welfare maximising bias and responsiveness of the seat-vote curve. Following Coate and Knight (2007) , we assume a linear functional form:
where V the quantity of nation-wide votes obtained by the Democratic party, a the bias (how many more seats than 50% the Democratic party would get with 50% of the votes) and b the responsiveness of the curve (how much the seat share would vary with a 1% variation in the vote percentage). The amount of votes V the Democratic party can expect to have is therefore:
The Democratic party will obtain the votes of all its partisans (π D ) and of all the swing voters who are expected to be on the left hand side of the indifferent voter i, with ideology (d + r)/2. Plugging this expression for Democratic votes (42) into the seat-vote function (41), and then plugging the resulting expression for S into parties' utilities (39) and (40), we can maximize each party's utility function with respect to its policy proposal and obtain parties' reaction function and the equilibrium policy platforms.
Proposition 5. If the implemented policy is decided through parliamentary bargaining, and the seat-vote curve is as in (41), the interior solution for parties' equilibrium policies is:d
Proof in Appendix
The proposed policies keep some of the characteristics present in the "majority voting" base case. Policies will be more liberal if there are more Democratic than Republican partisans in the population. Again the districting will affect equally the decision of both parties: if the districting favors the Democrats (a > 0), both policies will be dragged towards the left. Corollary 1. Given Proposition 5, the Democratic party will obtain on average exactly 50% of seats, and the expected policy implemented by the parliament will bê
Proof. Plugging (43) and (44) into (42), and then back again into (41), we can obtain the equilibrium expected seats share of the Democratic party in the House (Ŝ = 1/2), and the "bargained" policy (45). .
It can be noticed how the implemented policyx keeps the now well-known characteristics: more liberal if there are more liberals than conservatives, and more liberal if the gerrymanderer favored the Democrats when drawing the district lines. Moreover the elections, as in absence of bargaining, will produce on average an absolutely balanced House. Now that we know the equilibrium implemented policy (45), we can plug it in the social welfare function as in (22). The social planner will decide the seat-vote curve (i.e. a and b) such that social welfare is maximized.
Proposition 6. The social planner should implement a seat-vote curve such that a * = 0. The optimal value of the responsiveness b is instead indeterminate.
Proof. The Welfare function is defined as:
The function is concave, therefore applying first order conditions and solving for {a, b} is sufficient. Solving this system of equation, the result is obtained.
Again no result is obtained regarding the responsiveness of the seat-vote curve. Linear utilities make the quest for optimal responsiveness arduous. The optimal bias is nevertheless found as zero. No bias is needed in the seat-vote curve also when the implemented policy is the result of post-electoral bargaining. This is a further reassurance that no matter the constitution, and no matter the risk aversion of players, letting parties endogenously propose their policies to voters removes the need for a bias of the seat-vote curve in favor of the larger partisan group.
All these findings are summed up in Table I . The socially optimal seat-vote curve should be unbiased no matter the Constitution (parliamentary bargaining with exogenous or endogenous policy platforms, or majority voting with endogenous policy platforms) if voters and parties are risk-neutral, and parties are equally office-motivated. It should instead be biased against the largest party when voters and parties are risk-averse, while the "reinforcing" bias is socially optimal only in correspondence of exogenous party platforms, risk-aversion and parliamentary bargaining.
An Empirical Analysis
In this section we estimate the possible welfare gain from implementing the socially optimal districting in the base case, i.e. when voters are risk-neutral. To perform this analysis we need to calculate the welfare under the optimal districting W opt , and the actual districting W act . Both of these measures are calculated using the formula as in (22). Given that the value of the social welfare is within the [−1, 0] interval, we define the welfare gain as: 3
During this analysis we still assume that parties are solely policy-motivated (Assumption 2, Ω D = Ω R = 0). This assumption has two main consequences. Firstly, it implies that both parties are equally interested in winning. Secondly, this will allow us to find the maximum amount of welfare gain from implementing the socially optimal districting. Neither of these two implications seems to us particularly harmful.
As it can be seen from equation (22), in order to calculate the social welfare, whether actual or optimal, we need to know the composition of the population in each State (share of Democrats, Republicans and Independents), the value of the uncertainty parameters ( and τ ), and the identity of the median district. Once the median district has been identified, the value of the actual Democratic leaning of it can be found through this formula
and the value of Democratic leaning of the socially optimal median district can be found as in Proposition 2, i.e.
Lastly, we are able to calculate the policy platforms proposed by each party (d(κ m ) and r(κ m ), as in Proposition 1), and the probability of winning of the Democratic party (p(d, r) as in Lemma 1), in the case of both the actual and the optimal districting. The dataset, which contains the results of 28 U.S. State Lower Houses' elections between 1992 and 2000, has been kindly provided by Brian Knight, and it is the same on which Coate and Knight (2007) performed their empirical analysis. 
assuming β/γ ≥ 1; we instead assumed a simpler functional form: U i = L(i, x). According to their (more general) utility's functional form the value of welfare gain we find though equation (46) would be the maximum welfare gain. Choosing to use our simpler functional form, implicitly implies to assume that β/γ = 1. Our result relative to the welfare gain are perfectly comparable to the one by Coate and Knight (2007) . In fact in their paper they mostly refer to the maximimum welfare gains, which correspond to the case when β/γ = 1.
It contains the electoral results of the elections of State Lower Houses, for the 5 electoral rounds held after the redistricting that followed the 1990 Census (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000) together with demographic data on each district's population (e.g. average household income, percentage of African-Americans, elderly people, college graduates, share of urban, suburban and rural population). We also use State-level polling data from the New York Times-CBS survey 4 , in which a representative sample of voters is annually asked to self-identify as Democrat, Republican or Independent. For the purpose of this paper the 1991-2000 average level of self-identification as Democrat, Republican, or Independent in each of the 28 States is used.
From the raw data just described, we are in possession only of the shares of Democrats (π D ), Republicans (π R ) and Independents (π I ) for each State. We instead need to estimate the uncertainty parameters ( , τ ), to identify the median district, and to calculate the Democratic skewness κ act m . Once we have been able to do so, we can calculate through our theoretical findings the optimal Democratic bias of the median district, the policy platforms of the two parties according to both the actual and optimal districting, and finally the welfare and the welfare gain.
Empirical Technique
In this section it is explained the technique through which it is possible to estimate the composition of each district in terms of partisan Democrats and Republicans and Independents, and the uncertainty parameters.
First of all, we need to make more explicit the theoretical relation between the policy platforms proposed by the two parties, the composition of each district (and in particular the median one) and the amount of votes obtained by the Democratic Party. From Proposition 1 we know that the theoretical equilibrium policies proposed by the two parties are:
The amount of votes V j earned by the Democratic party in a representative district j are:
Substituting ind andr, and given Assumption 2 we obtain
where π Dj is the share of Democrats in district j, π Ij is the share of Independents in district j, κ m is the Democratic leaning of the median district, m is the ideology of the median swing voter, which is the result of the realization of a random variable with mean 1/2. It can be observed how while each Democratic partisan votes for the Democratic party, only a share of the Independents does. The amount of Independents voting Democratic depends on the policy platforms, which are affected by the districting (second expression of the right-hand side of equation (60)), and on the realization of the random shock hitting m (last expression of the right-hand side of equation (60)).
The only parameter of equation (60) that can be directly found in the data is V j : of each district we have at most five observations of the share of votes obtained by the Democratic party in each election round. All other variables need to be estimated.
Knowing the distribution of m, from equation (49) we can compute the mean E[V j ] and standard deviation σ V j of the Democratic share of votes, for a generic district j:
Analogous arguments can be applied to obtain the mean and standard deviation of the Democratic votes at the State level:
With a sufficiently long panel, the estimation of moments (mean and variance of votes to the Democratic party in each district and overall in each State) would simply consist of reporting the sample average and standard error. In the U.S. though, redistricting happens every ten years, and therefore for each district our database contains at most five observations. Moreover there is a non negligible number of uncontested districts, i.e. districts in which in all the five election rounds only one candidate ran. We therefore track the methodology already used in Coate and Knight (2007) , calculating the districts' moments as a function of the demographic characteristics of each district, using a bootstrapping technique over the following random effect model with heteroscedasticity:
where V jt is the share of votes to the Democratic party in district j at the election round t, X j is the demographic data on the district, θ 1 and θ 2 are the parameters to be estimated, and ξ j and ν j are the district-specific random effects, which are assumed to be normally distributed and with standard error σ ξ and σ ν , respectively. The last terms in the two equation are the usual white noise. The estimation technique is a standard two-step approach: first the percentage of votes to the Democratic party (V jt ) are regressed on the district characteristics (X j ). Then the log of the square residuals of the first-step regression is regressed on the same set of variables. This two-step regression is performed on the whole dataset, containing 28 States. State-specific dummies are added. In this way we allow districts with the same demographic characteristics, but belonging to different States to have different voting behavior. Nevertheless these regressions do not allow us to know the district-specific moments. Two sources of uncertainty are to be controlled: first of all we have the estimated and not the true values of the parameters of the two regressions (θ 1 , θ 2 , σ 1 , σ 2 ), secondly we do not observe the random effects (ξ j , ν j ). That is why a bootstrapping technique is used: for each replication r = 1, 2, ..., 100 a sample of size N is drawn with replacement from the dataset of N districts, where N is the number of districts with at least one contested election. Then the estimation with the standard twostep approach is performed for each of the 100 samples. In this way we obtain the entire distribution of the parameter estimates (θ r 1 , θ r 2 , σ r 1 , σ r 2 ) r=100 r=1 . Nevertheless to learn the district-specific mean and standard error we need a further step in order to take into account the random effects. We therefore draw from a standard normal distribution the random effects (ξ r j , ν r j ) for each replication r and each district j. Thus we can calculate the district-specific mean and variance:
We are then able to calculate the State-specific moments averaging across districts within a State, and use the average estimated parameters from the bootstrap to calculate the simulated mean and variance of the voting distribution of uncontested districts.
Calibration of the Theoretical Model
After having performed these regressions, we can then proceed to the calibration of our theoretical results. Firstly, from equation (54) we know that:
Moreover, in line with Coate and Knight (2007) , we assume that
Of these two equations, σ V is obtained from the bootstrap procedure just described, while π I is assumed to be equal to the data from the NYT-CBS polls. We can therefore obtain the State-level indices of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty ( and τ ). Consequently we can calculate the district-specific share of Independents:
Lastly, we are able to identify which is the median district for each State, and calculate the value of the Democratic skewness of it κ m . To do this, first of all we must recall the formula to calculate the Democratic skewness of a district:
Plugging equation (51) into (60) we obtain:
Even if κ m is still unknown, we are anyway able to order all the districts according to the value of
, and pinpoint which is the median district. For States with an even number of district we arbitrarily chose to pinpoint as the median the ( N 2 + 1)-th one.
Moreover, using State-averages, we are able to write down this further equation:
where π D and π I are the levels of party affiliation as in the CBS-NYT for each State. The value of E[V ] can be easily calculated from the data, therefore the only unknown left in equation (62) is κ m . Solving (62) for κ m we can finally obtain the current value of Democratic leaning κ act m of the median district of each State:
Knowing the value of the Democratic bias of the median dsitrct, it is then easy to calculate the theoretical policy proposals of the two parties (d act ,r act ) from Proposition 1, the socially optimal value for the Democratic skewness of the median districts κ * m from Proposition 2, and finally the theoretical optimal policy proposals of the two parties (d * ,r * ). With these data in hand, we have all the elements to calculate the social welfare in each State under the current and the optimal districting.
As it can be seen from Table II , the welfare gains from implementing the Socially Optimal Districting appear to be very small, even smaller than the one reported by Coate and Knight (2007) . In most of States the welfare gains are well below 1%.
Concluding remarks
We analyzed the socially optimal districting in a framework in which parties strategically commit to nationwide policies and decide the policy to implement through majority voting in the legislature. Parties react strategically to the districting, presenting policy platform that will be more liberal the more the districting is biased towards the Democrats. Given that the policy is chosen by majority voting, the median Representative is pivotal, and the median district is the only one affecting parties' decisions on policy platforms and social welfare.
We investigated what should be the districting, and more precisely the composition of the median district, in order to reach the welfare optimum. Secondarily, we analysed which seat-vote curve is coherent with the social optimum.
Our main result is that the social planner should build a median district that leans towards the most numerous partisan group, and towards the party that is more-office motivated, or more concerned with swing voters' welfare, in order to bring the expected implemented policy towards the welfare maximising policy. The consequent seat-vote curve that stems from this finding is unbiased as long as parties are symmetric and preferences are linear. Both parties win with equal probability by proposing policies skewed towards the larger partisan group in the population, i.e. equidistant from the welfare maximising policy. A tied election would therefore give way to the implementation of a policy which is more liberal if the population leans on the left, and more conservative if the population leans on the right, matching perfectly the welfare maximising policy.
This result is even more stark when voters and parties are risk averse instead of risk neutral: in these cases the socially optimal median district will be still leaning on the same side of the population's leaning, but to a lesser extent. Consequently the policy proposals will move, even if less decidedly, towards the same side towards which the population (and districting) lean. The party with a larger partisan base will get more than half of the votes and will expect to win exactly half of the seats. For this reason the seat-vote curve will show a small counterbalancing bias, i.e. a small bias against the larger party in the population.
These results contradict Coate and Knight's (2007) prescriptions to implement the socially optimal districting. In their seminal paper they modelled a polity in which parties' platform are exogenous, but the implemented policy is the result of a bargaining process in which the Representatives choose the policy which maximizes their joint utility. In such a setup, with risk-neutral voters, the social planner should draw the districts in such a way as to give rise to an unbiased seat-vote curve. When voters are instead risk-averse, the social planner should draw the districts in a way which is biased towards the party with a larger partisan base in the population. Their result is driven principally by two features of the model: firstly, because of the bargaining process in the House the social planner aims to let the average legislator have the same preferred policy as the socially optimal one; secondly with risk averse voters, the utility loss of partisans belonging to the larger partisan group ends up weighting more in the social welfare function, and therefore the social planner ends up biasing the districting in their favor.
The seat-vote curve remains unbiased also when we let parties' strategic choice on policy platform depend on Coate and Knight's (2007) parliamentary bargaining setup: as long as parties strategically and endogenously choose the policy platform and players are risk-neutral, even when the implemented policy is bargained among legislators, the socially optimal districting should not give any advantage to any party. If the districting authority internalizes the population policy preferences in the districting, parties' strategic policy choices will mirror population preferences, and therefore there will not be any need to engineer a biased seat-vote curve.
An empirical calibration of the base model (majority voting and risk-neutral agents) is performed on data from the U.S. State Lower Houses of 28 States for 5 electoral rounds (1992 to 2000) . It appears that implementing the Socially Optimal Districting would indeed increase the social welfare, but the size of this effect is even smaller than the one found by Coate and Knight (2007) : in most of States the welfare gain remains below 1%.
Further research is needed in order to analyse in more depth the political economy of districting and its policy and welfare consequences. The effects of migration across districts, the microfoundation of the bargaining process through which the House decides the implemented policy and the political economy motivations that lead politicians to devolve or not the competence on redistricting to independent commissions have yet to be analyzed.
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Appendix Coate and Knight (2007) with risk-neutral voters From Coate and Knight (2007) we know that the share of votes obtained by the Democratic Party is
where π I is the share of swing voters, π D the share of Democratic partisans, m the position of the median swing voter and τ the heterogeneity of preferences among swing voters. We can rearrange this expression and obtain:
The implemented policy is the weighted average of the Democratic party's policy 0 and the Republican party's policy 1, weighted by the seat share s. Therefore the position of the policy is simply 1 − s. Consequently we can write a social welfare function
that could also be transformed in this way:
We can then maximize W with respect to s through simple first order conditions, and substitute in this expression the value of m as in (65), and obtain the seat-vote curve:
Proof of Lemma 1.
The winner of elections will be the one who wins the median district, where districts are ordered according to their Democratic leaning κ. For simplicity the median district bias will be referred to as κ m .
The Democratic party wins if it carries the median district, i.e.:
Remember that the swing voters are distributed around the median m is distributed as ω ∼ U [m − τ, m + τ ], therefore
Substituting in in (70):
Moreover we have to consider that the position of the median voter is the realization of a random variable. We need therefore an explicit expression for m:
Recall that m ∼ U [1/2 − , 1/2 + ], therefore
From (72) and (73), we can obtain the probability p for the Democratic party to win:
Proof of Proposition 2
The Social Welfare function is:
withm =d +r 2 + τ κ m as long as {d,r} ∈ [1/2 − τ + , 1/2 + τ − ], i.e. as long as Condition 1 holds. This expression can be easily solved and differentiated, and leads to our main result according to which κ * = π D −π R π I . In the cases when Condition 1 does not hold, i.e. when at least one of the policy platforms {d,r} belongs to the interval {[0, 1/2−τ + ]∪[1/2+τ − , 1]}, the integral part of the welfare function becomes more complicated. This is due to the fact that one of the two policy platforms, for some value of m, is not going to be on the bliss point of any swing voter, but fall in an area "empty" of voters. This in turn makes the Social Welfare function less "symmetric" in its two components (the one according to which the Democrats win andd is implemented, and the one in which the Republican win and policyr is implemented). In this cases, it is not possible to find a closed form solution for the value of κ m that maximizes social welfare. It is anyway possible to state that is different from the one explicitly stated in the Proposition, and it is larger in absolute value.
Proof of Lemma 2, and Proposition 3
The votes the Democratic party is going to obtain at the national level are:
while the votes obtained by the Democratic party in the median district are:
Let's re-define in a more convenient way the skewness of the socially optimal median district:
From Proposition 2 we know that λ is going to be equal to zero when, for example, parties are equally office-motivated and the population is not too extremist (Ω D = Ω R and Condition 1 holds), and is going to be positive when the Democratic party is more office-motivated than the Republican, and the population is not too extremist (Ω D > Ω R and Condition 1 holds).
This can be summed up in a this way: Plugging in the equilibrium value of the policy platforms {d(κ * m ),r(κ * m )} from Proposition 1 and the welfare maximising value of the Socially Optimal Districting as in equation (79), we obtain the amount of votes obtained by the Democratic party when the Socially Optimal Districting is implemented.
and we can obtain the valuem of m for which V = 1/2:
When the randomly drawn position of the median swing voter ism is as in equation (81), the votes the Democratic party obtains in the median districts are: Table I : Socially optimal seat-vote curve bias according to the Constitution and players' risk-aversion. 
